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Abstract. This study analyzes and highlights the most practised forms of corruption in 
public hospitals of Douala metropolis in Cameroon, namely corruption with theft and that 
without theft. The results of our analyzes show a predominance of the form without theft, 
this regardless of the hospital, and this allowed us to classify hospitals based on the 
dominant form. It appears that the General and Deido Hospitals are health facilities where 
corruption without theft is the least and the most practiced respectively, while the Cité des 
Palmiers and New Bell hospitals are those where corruption with theft is the least and the 
most practiced. An estimate through odds ratios revealed for instance that the odds would 
be about 5.46 times higher that the form without theft is not practiced at the General 
hospital compared to other hospitals, and about 11.11 times that it is practiced at Deido 
hospital compared  to all hospitals. 
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1. Introduction 
ealth is a fundamental right and an engine of both personal and social 
development. It has a significant positive impact on economic growth, 
poverty reduction and consequently on the well-being of populations. 
Unfortunately, the 2006 global report by Transparency International shows that 
corruption pervasiveness in the health sector undermines populations’ access to 
health care. Certainly, corruption negatively affects all countries of the world, but 
its effects are particularly dramatic in developing and transition economies already 
under-resourced (Vian, 2002). Gangrened by corruption which is both the cause 
and consequence of their ills, developing countries have seen their health system 
being deteriorated (World Bank, 2004). Several studies demonstrate that informal 
payments are responsible for the deterioration of the quality of health care provided 
to the poorest patients (Szende, & Culyer, 2006). Investigations carried out in 
Eastern Europe and Asia highlight that corruption in the form of informal payments 
of health care encourages patients to postpone their medical consultations (Lewis, 
2000), hence the call of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2011) 
to fight against this scourge in all its forms (gifts, embezzlements, bribes, etc.) in 
the health sector.            
To better cope with this phenomenon, investigations have been carried out over 
the last thirty years by various institutions (World Bank, Transparency 
International, the International Monetary Fund and Universities). Thus, starting 
from the popular definition that corruption is the abuse of  public property for 
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personal gain, most of these studies can be divided into two groups: those relating 
to grand corruption (Mauro, 2002; Akunyili, 2006) and those on petty corruption 
(Maestad, & Mwisongo, 2007).    
Great corruption distorts the allocative role of the State in that it affects the 
structure of public expenditure for programs facilitating the taking of bribes 
(Mauro, 2002). In this perspective, investments in the health sector often favour the 
building of new hospitals, and the purchase of very expensive high-tech equipment 
at the detriment of primary health care programs such as vaccination and family 
planning (Mauro, 2002; Winston, 1979). As concerns petty corruption, it 
introduces discrimination of patients and creates scarcity of goods and services. For 
instance, to allow patients to pay bribes, medical staff may be tempted to create 
queues, simulate drugs shortage or pretend that the most effective drugs are 
expensive. Because they lengthen the consultation period and shorten the time 
devoted to patients, artificial queues contribute to lower the quality of medical 
services (Maestad, & Mwisongo, 2007). Shleifer & Vishny (1993) argue that the 
ability of the State agent to handle the consultation period for his/her own account 
increases when the latter is in a monopoly situation. He/she can collect bribes in 
two ways: corruption with stealing or corruption without stealing. In the first case, 
the price of the service is equal to the bribe and in the second case, the service price 
is equal to the official price plus the bribe. These works are important because they 
enable to refine strategies to fight against corruption. In particular, it is now known 
that to reduce corrupt practices, State agents should be asked to give account for 
their actions (Klitgaard, 1989; Vian 2007). However, they are limited not only 
because of the ignorance of consequences of the phenomenon, but also, because 
they did not take into account the different forms of corruption. Thus, if the 
theoretical literature provides a detailed reading grid (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; 
Kaufman & Wei, 1999; Lui, 1985) of specific situations, the empirical literature on 
contrary remains limited.  
In particular, Gupta et al. (2002) tried to fill these gaps, by applying the model 
of Shleifer & Vishny (1993) for 71 countries based on data from CIET 
(Community Information, Empowerment, Transparency) International, World 
Bank and Transparency International. This study is important because it helped to 
know that corruption negatively affects indicators of health care provision. It also 
reveals that corruption has a negative impact on girls' education. Unfortunately, it 
does not highlight the practiced forms of corruption which are the foundation of 
Shleifer & Vishny’s model (1993).     
Indeed, the data used by Gupta et al. (2002) are the result of surveys of 
businessmen plying countries worldwide, unfortunately without getting in touch 
with users of public hospitals. As these authors themselves stated, the respondents 
do not have information about corruption which is practiced between officials of 
these hospitals and users. However, such information enable to test for each 
hospital and in relation to all the selected hospitals, if according to Shleifer & 
Vishny’s (1993) view, the price of a service is equal either to the bribe only 
(corruption with theft) or to the official price plus the bribe (corruption without 
theft). In contrast, the data used in this study allow us to distinguish these forms of 
corruption on the one hand, because they result from a survey (Thanks to the 
African Economic Research Consortium (Nairobi, Kenya) for the funding of the 
survey) of users usually attending these hospitals, and to make a typology 
according to the dominant form of corruption, and this by hospital and for all 
hospitals in general on the other.    
The second part of this work succinctly presents a brief review of the literature 
on the impact of corruption forms on health care supply. The methodological 
aspects are presented and discussed in the third part. The fourth part highlights the 
functioning of health system in Cameroon, and the various corrupt practices 
encountered in this system. The results obtained are presented, interpreted and 
discussed in part five, this before concluding the study.  
2. Literature Review  
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It is difficult to set corruption boundaries; they are closely linked to local laws 
and customs. Due to the difference in customs, an act considered as corrupt in 
region A may not be the same in region B. However, in many so-called corruption 
cases, everyone can much agree to say that this type of behaviour is reprehensible 
and socially harmful to the society (Klitgaard, 1989). Vian (2006) proposes a series 
of very common forms of corruption in hospitals’ administration. These forms can 
be classified into three categories, as they are primarily related to the functioning of 
private health facilities; secondly, to the recruitment of students in  medical 
training schools, thirdly, to the transfer of health professionals in high positions and 
finally, the abuse of medical goods and services.         
In the first category, the common corruption forms are absenteeism and 
diversion of patients. Prado & Chawla (2006) define absenteeism as the 
unjustifiable or unexplained absence of employees. When public hospitals’ workers 
benefit from absenteeism by making profit for instance from income generated by a 
second job (Yamb, & Bikoué, 2016), the concept of absenteeism joins the 
definition of bribery stated by the World Bank: “the use of the position of manager 
of public service for personal profits". Based on the statistics of countries as 
disparate like Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and Uganda. Chaudhury 
et al. (2006) estimate an average absenteeism of 19% for education and 35% for 
health workers.   
The diversion of patients is also related to the functioning of the private sector. 
Indeed, several private health facilities have as promoters, the medical doctors 
working in public hospitals. For these doctors, this practice aims at welcoming 
patients in public hospitals, and then guide them to their private clinics for medical 
follow up (Yamb, & Bayemi, 2015). This form of corruption is related to the 
privatization of public hospitals insofar as doctors make good use their functions to 
get private clients. 
In theory, absenteeism and diversion of patients are explained both by the level 
of wages, the flexibility of worked hours as well as the risks incurred (Allen, 
1981). In developing countries, low wages, job loss which is not a big risk could 
therefore encourage absenteeism. It also seems that the possibility of finding a new 
job is another factor favouring absenteeism and diversion of patients (Shapiro & 
Stiglitz, 1984). Thus, when the labour market is buoyant, absenteeism and 
diversion of patients increase.     
To address this first category of corruption forms, it is necessary to increase the 
salaries of health professionals. But for most developing countries, this solution is 
not possible, given the insufficiency of budgetary resources. In contrast, in some 
countries where wages can be increased, it is questionable whether this measure 
alone is sufficient. However, wages increase reduce bribes, but do not cancel them 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1998). As a matter of fact, a high salary may simply lead a civil 
servant to require a consistent bribe able to compensate the risk of losing what is 
now a quite interesting job. 
In the second category of corruption forms adopted by Vian (2006), we can 
retain the privileged access to medical training schools and the sale of offices in 
hospital administrations. 
Students or parents who agree to rely on bribes for admissions in medical 
schools threaten the expertise of the well-trained medical staff. In her article on the 
"Taxonomy of Corruption in Higher Education," Rumyantseva (2005) notes that 
Higher Education has a decisive influence on youths’ values and beliefs on the 
concepts of good and evil, and on leaders of a country. Thus, corruption in 
education is a priority problem.  
Another common abuse is, for a medical doctor, to pay bribe to his/her 
hierarchical superior in order to be either maintained or transferred to a "juicy" 
position. The Sale of positions is opposed to merit principle. Generally speaking, in 
systems where rent seeking provides better opportunities for gains than the 
productive sector, the allocation of talents will experience inflection, and members 
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of the elite will turn to non-productive activities, thus determining a reduction of 
social surplus and growth (Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1991; 1993).   
To deal with the two last forms of corruption, meritocracy must be 
institutionalized not only in the recruitment of candidates in medical schools, but 
also in the processes of officials’ appointments to senior positions.  
The institutionalization of merit principles is made difficult by the fact that 
some actors of officials’ promotion through corrupt acts do not consider actions 
they take as such. For example in Africa, some elected officials who use their 
discretion power, their hierarchical position to promote the appointment of their 
nationals (clan, community, association), do not consider this practice as 
corruption, since it is not perceived as such by the actors. Corruption there would 
simply be an extension of traditional practices of gifts exchange (Médard, 2002).  
The third category which is the abuse of goods and services that public 
hospitals’ officials are supposed to provide patients with is basically translated in 
the stealing of drugs, improper payments and intervention of personalities.  
The stealing of drugs is another common problem in public hospitals. Certainly, 
all thefts are not part of corrupt actions, but from the moment which those who 
have power systematically abuse their position to appropriate medications 
belonging to hospitals, we can talk about corruption. Large quantities of drugs and 
medical equipment are diverted from the central reserves and individual stocks to 
be sold for personal gain (Ferinho, et al. 2004).   
In developing countries, health expenditure on pharmaceuticals and drugs can 
represent between 20 and 50% of public health budget (Vian, 2002). On average, 
the share on corruption is from 10 to 25% of the public purchasing in the health 
sector (WHO, 2008). Corruption in the field of medications and medical equipment 
reduces access to essential drugs, particularly for the most vulnerable groups. The 
absence of drugs can make a treatment to be postponed or stopped. Corruption 
reduces the quantity of drugs available in hospitals. The quality of health care 
decreases. To put essential drugs at affordable prices at the disposal of everyone is 
a required condition to improve national health indicators.   
To curb corruption in drugs promotion activities, governments are called upon 
to prohibit the practice of gifts according to the WHO Ethical guidelines on drug 
promotion (WHO, 2008). But such a measure is limited in many African countries 
where the practice of gifts is part of the custom (Klitgaard, 1989). According to the 
World Health Organization, to improve access to drugs might save the lives of over 
10 million people each year (WHO, 2004).      
In many developing countries, some patients have access to public services 
thanks to the intervention of high personalities from officials managing these 
services. Other patients access through informal payments. According to surveys 
that the National Institute of Statistics conducted in Cameroon (INS, 2011) from 
households in 2007, these two approaches are common in hospitals with a high 
prevalence of irregular payments grouped into corruption without theft and 
corruption with theft. However, the survey conducted by the INS in 2007 did not 
highlight these two forms of corruption, hence the relevance of this study.  
 
3. Methodological Aspects 
We will first present the basic model, secondly, the technique used in 
determining the sample size and, finally, the estimation method.  
 
3.1. The Basic Model 
Among corruption models, that of Shleifer & Vishny (1993) appears to be the 
easiest to analyze, within the framework of the provision of social services by the 
State, the causes and consequences of corruption. In their scheme, bribes are paid 
by consumers for goods and services provided by the State. State officials are 
supposed to exercise monopoly power by determining the quantities of goods or 
services offered, either by multiplying the deadlines or simply refusing to serve 
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them. Two cases of corruption are considered, and all have harmful consequences 
for the provision of goods and services.  
In the first case, the official gives a higher price that is official. P = Value + 
bribe. For the official, the marginal cost is equal to the official price, and the agent 
determines the quantity offered by equating the marginal revenue to the marginal 
cost as in the case of a classic monopoly. Bribe is a tax. The official retains the 
bribe and transfers the official price to the public Treasury. Figure 1 below 
illustrates this case as "corruption without theft ". The result is that bribe increases 
the price and decreases the amount. In these circumstances, some consumers will 
inevitably be squeezed out of the market.  
 
 
Figure 1. Corruption with Theft 
Source: Adapted from Shleifer & Vishny (1993) 
 
In the second case, the official does not transfer to the public Treasury the 
official amount required by the State for the service rendered. This is "corruption 
with theft" (Fig.2). In another perspective, the State service is stolen by the agent in 
charge of delivering it, and the bribe is collected from the consumer. In this case, 
the State agent still equates marginal revenue to marginal cost, but the latter 
remains zero for him/her. Thus, the bribe that the consumer pays may be lower 
than the official price. From this point of view, the cost of the provision of goods 
and services is under-charged. Such a situation is attractive for the consumer, and 
aligns his/her interests with those of the official, thus making corruption more 
difficult to detect. This creates a loss of revenue to the public Treasury, and the 
agent is able to exercise more discretion than in the case of corruption without 
theft. He/she may choose to lower the price level, and thus increase the demand for 
a good or service, and increase the loss of the public Treasury income. A smallest 
bribe has the advantage of reducing the risk of being detected. 
 
 
Figure 2. Corruption without Theft 
Source: Adapted from Shleifer & Vishny (1993) 
 
3.2. Determination and characteristics of the sample size 1 
As we are unable to determine an approximate P value through a prior survey 
(because to our knowledge, no investigation about corruption in public hospitals 
has yet been carried out in Cameroon), that is to say, the proportion P of 
respondents in the context of a preliminary study, we set P to 0.5, this value 
representing the worst case, that is to say, the value which gives the greatest 
possible standard deviation for the sampling distribution of P  . In this case, the 
 
1 This determination of the sample size and its features are inspired from the Article (Yamb, & 
Bayemi, 2015). 
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required sample size to ensure an error margin E (in absolute value) not exceeding 
5% with a confidence level of 95% will be about (Baillargeon, 1989):                           
n = with E The margin error, Z The standard 
normal distribution,  the estimator of P in the preliminary study. The distribution 
of the number of individuals to be interviewed is done from the number of medical 
and paramedical staff in each hospital selected as shown in the following Table.  
 
Table 1. Distribution of the Number of Patients to Interview per Hospital 
 Hospital Staff Number Hospital Importance (In %) Number of Users to  Interview 
Laquintinie  630 41 157 
General  326 21 81 
New-Bell 113 7 27 
Bonassama  103 7 25 
Palmiers 100 6 25 
Deido 84 5 21 
Logbaba 80 5 20 
Nylon 62 4 15 
Bonamoussadi  57 4 14 
Total 1, 555 100 384 
Source: Our estimates based on information collected at the Regional Health Delegation Littoral on 
the number of hospitals  
 
The first column describes the type of hospital, the second column the total 
number of medical and paramedical staff, the third indicates the weight or 
importance of the personnel of each hospital as compared to the staff of all 
hospitals in general, and the last column, the approximate number of people who 
should be interviewed by hospital, based on the weight of each hospital. We came 
up with a total of 384 interviewees. For prudence sake, we distributed 415 
questionnaires with the assumption that all incorrectly completed questionnaires 
would be eliminated, this to help approximately achieve the sample’s size. Thus, 
407 questionnaires were filled out correctly and therefore validated. It is on the 
basis of these 407 questionnaires that the analysis was performed. 
 
3.3. Estimation methodology: an approach through odds ratios  
To highlight the two corruption forms most practiced in the provision of health 
care in Cameroonian public hospitals and those of Douala in particular, two types 
of questions were asked to users namely: to be consulted, the patient only pays a 
bribe (corruption with theft) on the one hand, and, to be consulted, the patient pays 
the required official fees plus the bribe (corruption without theft) on the other. We 
then preceded with an estimate through odds ratios while identifying different 
hospitals affected by the phenomenon. This was apprehended by constructing for 
each hospital the following double entry contingency table for each of the forms 
practiced (with and without theft): 
 
Table 2. Contingency Table for the Form Practiced 
                         Corruption 
Hospital  
Form practiced 
No Yes 
Hospital i N11 N12 
All  hospitals j  N21 N22 
 
In table 2 and for a given form, each hospital i  is compared with all hospitals j, 
this through the calculation of the following odds ratio:  
 
     11 22
/
21 12
i j
N N
N N
   
 
    
 
2 2
2
22
0,5 0,5 1,96
384
4 4 0,05
Z
E
 
 

P
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An odds ratio 
/ 1i j   stipulates that for hospital i , the practiced form has a 
smaller effect compared to all remaining hospitals j , and an / 1i j   will have the 
opposite effect.  
 
4. Hospitals’ Functioning and Corrupt Practices  
As in the entire Cameroon, in Douala, the health sector is made up of private 
and public hospitals. If we take into account the last category on which the present 
study is based, there are essentially reference and district hospitals which operate 
under the Ministry of Health. The first two are: the Laquintinie and the General 
Hospitals, and the second: the Deido Hospital, the Bonassama hospital, the 
Bonamoussadi hospital, the Cité des Palmiers Hospital, the New-bell hospital, the 
Nylon hospital and the Logbaba hospital. District hospitals are dedicated in 
particular to firstly ensure a better quality of health care through motivated and 
disciplined staff, and for whom the patient becomes their only concern. Then, these 
hospitals must ensure a better decentralized management of money recovery of 
medical procedures, drugs and prepayments to be set up for progressive 
empowerment. And finally, they must support emergencies and hospitalized 
patients. Reference hospitals are above district hospitals. It is all about high level 
technical structures which in terms of specialized health care assure reference and 
anti-reference, and welcome patients from district hospitals. To assure the 
reference, these two hospitals have specialized doctors and special medical 
equipment which are absent in district hospitals. However, the status of the 
Laquintinie hospital is somewhat different from that of the General hospital. With 
legal personality and financial autonomy, the General hospital is more independent 
from the Ministry of Health than the Laquintinie hospital. The first recruits its own 
medical doctors and pay them higher salaries than those earned by doctors at the 
Laquintinie hospital and others. The latter are paid by the Ministry of Finance. In 
early 1990s, Cameroonian civil servants have experienced a decrease of more than 
50% of their salaries within the framework of the structural adjustment programs 
enacted by the Bretton Woods’ institutions. Meanwhile, they have certainly 
recorded some salary increases. But these have failed to meet their former living 
standards.  
Thus, following ECAM3 (National Institute of Statistics of Cameroon, 2007), 
nearly 85% of households’ heads living in urban and semi-urban feel that the level 
of corruption in the health sector is high in this country. But the magnitude of the 
phenomenon varies from one region to another (69.8% in Douala and 61.1% in 
Yaoundé). This reflects a general malaise. As a matter of fact, if access to basic 
social services including health is a constant concern of the public authorities, 
corruption in the health sector is like a gangrene which tends to negate the efforts 
of the State (INS, 2011). 
     
5. Findings and Discussion  
5.1. Descriptive Statistics And Estimate Through Odds Ratios 
The table below identifies the two most practiced corruption forms in public 
hospitals in the city of Douala, namely the form with theft and the one without 
theft, as well as a classification of hospitals based on the least practiced form: it is 
common that whatever the hospital, the form without theft predominates.   
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Table 3. Typology of Hospitals Based on the Least Practiced Corruption Form  
 To be consulted, the patient only pays a bribe 
(corruption with theft) 
 The patient who wants to be consulted must pay 
official fees plus the bribe (corruption without theft) 
Hospital No Yes Total Rank Hospital No Yes Total Rank 
Palmiers 23(88.5%) 3(11.5%) 26(100.0%) 1 General 54(64.3%) 30(35.7%) 84(100.0%) 1 
General 74 (88.1%) 10(11.9%) 84(100.0%) 2 Logbaba 13(61.9%) 8(38.1%) 21(100.0%) 2 
Logbaba 18 (85.7%) 3(14.3%) 21(100.0%) 3 Bonassama 13(39.4%) 20(60.6%) 33(100.0%) 3 
Bonamoussdi 12(85.7%) 2(14.3%) 14(100.0%) 3 New-bell 11(39.3%) 17(60.7%) 28(100.0%) 4 
New-bell 23(82.1%) 5(17.9%) 28(100.0%) 5 Palmiers 10(38.5%) 16(61.5%) 26(100.0%) 5 
Bonassama 26(78.8%) 7(21.2%) 33(100.0%) 6 Bonamoussadi 4(28.6%) 10(71.4%) 14(100.0%) 6 
Laquintinie 114 (69.9%) 49 (30.1%) 163(100.0%) 7 Laquintinie 26(16.0%) 137(84.0%) 163(100.0%) 7 
Deido 15 (68.2%) 7 (31.8%) 22(100.0%) 8 Nylon 2(12.5%) 14(87.5%) 16(100.0%) 8 
Nylon 4(25.0%) 12(75.0%) 16(100.0%) 9 Deido 1(4.5%) 21(95.5%) 22(100.0%) 9 
Total 309(75,9%) 98(24,1%) 407(100,0%)  Total 134(32.9%) 273(67.1%) 407(100.0%)  
Source: Our estimates based on the survey results 
 
The above table shows a classification of hospitals from the least to the most 
corrupt (from 1 to 9), based on the form practiced. We see that if we take for 
example the form without theft, the General Hospital ranks first. In other words, it 
is the least corrupt health facility compared to all hospitals. The same thing goes 
with the Deido Hospital which ranks ninth, that is, the last, thus appearing as the 
most corrupt health facility.       
The table below shows the estimated odds ratios for each hospital compared to 
all hospitals, as well as the corresponding confidence intervals for each form 
practiced. Indeed, the estimate through odds ratios not only refines the analysis of 
the descriptive results of table 3, but it also confirms them: in fact, we find that the 
General Hospital comes as the structure that has the least probability for a 
`particular form of corruption to be practiced, compared to other hospitals. 
Estimates by odds ratios stipulate for example that for the form without theft, we 
have about 5.46 times more likely that it is not practiced in this hospital compared 
to other hospitals, while these odds are about 11.11 (1/0.09) times higher that this 
form is practiced at the Deido hospital compared to other hospitals.     
 
Table 4. Odds Ratios and Estimated Confidence Intervals of Hospital i Compared to all 
Hospitals j 
Hospital Corruption with theft Corruption without theft 
/
ˆ
i j  
Confidence Interval at 95% 
/
ˆ
i j  
/
ˆ
i j  
Confidence Interval at 95% de 
/
ˆ
i j  
General 2.77  (1.37 ; 5.60) 5.46 (3.27 ; 9.13) 
Laquintinie 0.58 (0.37 ; 0.92) 0.24 (0.14 ; 0.38) 
Logbaba 1.95 (0.56 ; 6.80) 3.55 (1.43 ; 8.81) 
Deido 0.66 (0.26 ; 1.67) 0.09 (0.01; 0.67) 
Bonamoussadi 1.93  (0.42 ; 8.82) 0.80 (0.24 ; 2.62) 
Bonassama 1.19 (0.50 ; 2.84) 1.35 (0.65 ; 2.82) 
Palmiers 2.54 (0.74 ; 8.67) 1.30 (0.57 ; 2.93) 
Nylon 0.09 (0.029 ; 0.03) 0.28 (0.06 ; 1.25) 
New- Bell 1.49 (0.55 ; 4.04) 1.34 (0.61 ; 2.96) 
Source: Our estimates based on the results of Table 3. 
 
5.2. Discussion   
Estimates results through odds ratios show that the General hospital reveals 
itself as the structure where the form with or without theft is less common. On the 
contrary, these forms are the most practiced at Nylon (form with theft) and Deido 
hospitals (form without theft) respectively.    
That said, hospitals where the form with theft is quite high can be considered 
as structures where the basic rules of hospital management are not respected either 
by managers or by the agents, and even less by users. Indeed in these hospitals, the 
patient acts as if he/she was in a conquered territory. The informal outweighs the 
formal. During consultation for example, some doctors do not hesitate to appeal to 
intermediaries who informally welcome patients and direct them to their offices. 
These patients are not officially registered by the administration of the hospital. It 
is precisely during this registration that the patient pays the official ticket that gives 
him/her access to consultation by the doctor. Consequently, the actual number of 
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patients care for at the end does not correspond to the number recorded. A situation 
obviously profitable to the doctor, his/her intermediaries, and even the user 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1993). However, in hospitals where registration is done 
according to the regulations in force (in the formal case), this practice is scarce. In 
this case, the number of patients care for almost matches the number recorded. The 
doctor in this case may require from the patient a bribe in addition to the 
registration fee. Institutional failures can therefore promote corrupt practices, 
notably the form without theft.   
 
6. Conclusion     
This study aimed at highlighting the most obvious corruption forms in public 
hospitals in Douala, namely the form without theft and that with theft. A 
classification based on different forms and by hospital was also performed 
according to the least practiced form: it can be seen that in all hospitals, the form 
without theft is the most practiced. And with regard to the latter, the General 
Hospital stands as the health facility where it is the least practiced, and the Deido 
Hospital as the one where it is most practiced. The Nylon and Cité des Palmiers 
hospitals for the form with theft are those in which it is the most and the least 
practiced respectively. In fact, the quality of institutions set up plays a key role in 
the practice of any form of corruption. Indeed, hospitals where hospital regulations 
are not respected excel in the practice of the form with theft. Informal in this case 
takes over the formal insofar as some patients are not registered by the 
administration of the hospital when they are care for. This is what favours this form 
of corruptive practice where nothing goes into the State’s coffers. On the contrary, 
the form without theft is more practiced in hospitals where patients’ registration is 
done according to standards. In this case, the required official amount for 
consultation goes into the hospital’s coffers. However, the doctor pockets the bribe.    
This study is limited at least on two points. Firstly, it concerns public hospitals 
only. Private hospitals are not taken into account. Yet, it is possible that some 
forms practiced in the public are not seen in the private. Secondly, it ignores the 
users’ characteristics which nevertheless can serve as discrimination tools for the 
doctor looking for a higher gain in his/her collection of bribe. Several studies 
(Rose-Ackerman 1978; Johnston 1986; Cartier & Bresson, 1995) show that 
corruption effects highly depend on transaction characteristics and on agents who 
develop them. Future researches can help fill those gaps.    
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